Abstract-The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel (WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM) channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset choices. The SS criterion demands negligible mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observations even when maximized over all message distributions.
Their main drawback lies in the assumption that the message is random and uniformly distributed, as real-life messages are neither (messages may be files, votes or any type of structured data, often with low entropy). Semantic-security (SS) [3] , [4] is a cryptographic gold standard that was proposed in [2] as an adequate alternative and shown to be equivalent to a vanishing unnormalized mutual information for all message distributions. Adopting SS as our secrecy measure, we establish the SScapacity of the wiretap channel of type II (WTC II) with a noisy main channel, for which even the secrecy-capacity was an open problem until now. On top of that, the SS-capacity and the strong-secrecy-capacity are shown to coincide.
Secret communication over noisy channels dates back to Wyner who introduced the degraded wiretap channel (WTC) and derived its weak-secrecy-capacity [5] . Csiszár and Körner extended Wyner's result to the non-degraded WTC [6] , which is henceforth referred to as the WTC I. A special instance of the WTC I is when the eavesdropper's observation is an outcome of a discrete-memoryless (DM) erasure channel (EC), which essentially means that he observes a subset of the transmitted symbols which is chosen at random by nature. The WTC II was proposed by Ozarow and Wyner [7] as a generalization of this instance, where a more powerful eavesdropper selects which subset to observe and security must hold versus all possible subset choices. Thus, the main challenge in establishing security for the WTC II boils down to finding a single sequence of codes that work well for each of the exponentially many subsets the eavesdropper may choose. In [7] , the authors overcome this difficulty when the main channel is noiseless by relying on a unique randomized coset coding scheme in the proof of achievability. The derived rate-equivocation region was also shown to be tight, which solved the noiseless main channel scenario. The WTC II with a general (i.e., possibly noisy) DM main channel, however, remained an open problem ever since.
A recent endeavor at the optimal secrecy rate of the WTC II with a noisy main channel was presented in [8] (see also [9] [10] [11] [12] for related work). Requiring a vanishing average error probability and security with respect to the weak-secrecy metric (namely, while assuming a uniformly distributed message and a normalized mutual information), the authors of [8] extended the coset coding scheme from [7] to obtain an inner bound on the rate-equivocation region. An outer bound was also established by assuming that the subset the eavesdropper chooses to observe is revealed to all parties (i.e., to the legitimate users). Specializing these bounds to the maximal equivocation results in an inner and an outer bound on the weak-secrecy-capacity of a general WTC II; these bounds do not match.
In this work, we strengthen both the reliability and the security criteria, and derive the SS-capacity of the WTC II with a noisy main channel under a vanishing maximal error probability requirement. In the heart of the proof stands a stronger version of the soft-covering lemma which is key for the security analysis. Wyner's original soft-covering lemma [13, Theorem 6.3 ] is a valuable tool for achievability proofs of information theoretic security [14] [15] [16] [17] , resolvability [18] , channel synthesis [19] , and source coding [20] (see also references therein). The result herein sharpens the claim of softcovering by moving away from an expected value analysis. Instead, we show that a random codebook achieves the softcovering phenomenon with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength, enabling more powerful applications through the union bound. Specifically, the lemma lets one prove the existence of codebooks that satisfy exponentially many secrecy-related constraints, which, in turn, resolves the difficulty in the security analysis for the WTC II.
As a simple preliminary application of the stronger softcovering lemma, we derive the SS-capacity of the DM-WTC I under a maximal error probability requirement. In [21] , this result was established in terms of source universal coding based on the expurgation technique (e.g., cf. [22, Theorem 7.7 .1]) for the broadcast channel with confidential messages [6] , which subsumes the WTC I as a special case. Efficient code constructions with polynomial complexity that achieve the SS-capacity under an average error probability constraint were presented in [2] for the DM scenario and in [23] for the Gaussian case, while [24] derived the Gaussian SS-capacity under a maximal error probability constraint. Complexity not being in the scope of this work, we focus on the fundamental limits of semantically-secure communication and give an alternative proof of the WTC I SS-capacity based on the stronger soft-covering lemma and classic wiretap codes. Since the number of secret messages is only exponentially large, the double-exponential decay the lemma provides ensures SS with arbitrarily high probability. In other words, even though a codebook that satisfies exponentially many constraints related to soft-covering is required, the union bound yields that such a codebook exists. This code is then amended to be reliable with respect to the maximal error probability by relying on the well-known expurgation technique (e.g., cf. [22, Theorem 7.7 
.1]).
Somewhat surprisingly, our optimal code construction for the WTC II is just the same. Here, SS involves a vanishing unnormalized mutual information (between the message and the eavesdropper's observation), when maximized over all message distributions and eavesdropper's subset choices. However, noting that their combined number grows only exponentially with the blocklenght, the stronger soft-covering lemma is still sharp enough to imply that the probability of an insecure random wiretap code is doubly-exponentially small. As for the WTC I, reliability is upgraded to account for maximal error probability using expurgation. The direct proof shows that any rate up to the weak-secrecy-capacity of the WTC I with a DM-EC 1 to the eavesdropper, is achievable. The converse follows by showing that the weak-secrecy-capacity of this WTC I upper bounds the SS-capacity of the WTC II. An important consequence of the WTC II SS-capacity proof is that Wyner's wiretap codes for the erasure WTC I, are optimal. The binary version of these codes is, in fact, one of the few examples for which there are explicit constructions of practical secure encoders and decoders with optimal performance [25] , [26] . This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides definitions and basic properties. In Section III we state the stronger soft-covering lemma and provide its proof. Section IV describes the WTC I and gives an alternative stronger softcovering lemma based derivation of its SS-capacity. In Section V we define the WTC II, state its SS-capacity and prove the result. Finally, Section VI summarizes the main achievements and insights of this work.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. Given two real numbers a, b, we denote by [a : b] the set of integers n ∈ N ⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋ . We define R + = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g., X , the complement of X is denoted by X c , while |X | stands for its cardinality. X n denoted the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element of X n is denoted by x n = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ); whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x. For any S ⊆ [1 : n], we use x S = (x i ) i∈S to denote the substring of x n defined by S, with respect to the natural ordering of S. For instance, if S = [i : j], where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, then x S = (x i , x i+1 , . . . , x j ). Let Ω, F , P be a probability space, where Ω is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure. Random variables over Ω, F , P are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X, with similar conventions for random vectors. The probability of an event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while P(A B ) denotes conditional probability of A given B. We use 1 A to denote the indicator function of A. The set of all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ). PMFs are denoted by the capital letter P , with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability space Ω, F , P and two correlated random variables X and Y over that space, we use P X , P X,Y and P X|Y to denote, respectively, the marginal PMF of X, the joint PMF of (X, Y ) and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, P X|Y represents the stochastic matrix whose elements are given by P X|Y (x|y) = P X = x|Y = y . We omit subscripts if the arguments of the PMF are lowercase versions of the random variables. The support of a PMF P and the expectation of a random variable X are denoted by supp(P ) and E X , respectively.
For a discrete measurable space (Ω, F ), a PMF Q ∈ P(Ω) gives rise to a probability measure on (Ω, F ), which we denote by P Q ; accordingly, P Q A) = ω∈A Q(ω), for every A ∈ F . We use E Q to denote an expectation taken with respect to P Q . For a random variable X, we sometimes write E X to emphasize that the expectation is taken with respect to P X . For a sequence of random variable X n , if the entries of X n are drawn in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner according to P X , then for every x ∈ X n we have P X n (x) = n i=1 P X (x i ) and we write
where
to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to the PMF P X and the non-negative number ǫ [27, Chapter 3], i.e., we have
(2) The relative entropy between two probability measures P and Q on the same σ-algebra F of subsets of the sample space X , with P ≪ Q (i.e., P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q) is
where dP dQ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative between P and Q. If the sample space X is countable, (3) reduces to
III. THE STRONGER SOFT-COVERING LEMMA Wyner's soft-covering lemma [13, Theorem 6.3] states that the distribution induced by selecting a u-sequence at random from an appropriately chosen set C n and passing it through a memoryless channel Q V |U , results in a good approximation of Q n V in the limit of large n, as long as the set is of size |B n | = 2 nR , where R > I(U ; V ) ( Fig. 1) . In fact, the set can be chosen quite carelessly -by random codebook construction, drawing each sequence independently from the distribution Q n U . The soft-covering lemmas in the literature use a distance metric on distributions (commonly total variation or relative entropy) and claim that the distance between the induced distribution P (Bn) V and the desired distribution Q n V vanishes in expectation over the random selection of the set 2 . In the literature, [18] studies the fundamental limits of softcovering as "resolvability", [28] provides rates of exponential convergence, [19] improves the exponents and extends the framework, [29] and [30, Chapter 16] refer to soft-covering simply as "covering" in the quantum context, [31] refers to it as a "sampling lemma" and points out that it holds for the stronger metric of relative entropy, and [32] gives a recent direct proof of the relative entropy result.
Here we give a stronger claim. With high probability with respect to the set construction, the distance vanishes exponentially quickly with the blocklength n. The negligible probability of the random set not producing this desired result is doubly-exponentially small.
Let W = 1 : 2 nR and B n = U(w) w∈W be a set of random vectors that are i.i.d. according to Q n U . We refer to B n as the random codebook. Let C n = u(w, B n ) w∈W denote a realization of B n . For every fixed B n , the induced distribution is:
Lemma 1 (Stronger Soft-Covering Lemma) For any Q U , Q V |U , and R > I(U ; V ), where |V| < ∞, there exist γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, such that for n large enough
More precisely, for any n ∈ N and δ ∈ 0, R − I(U ; V )
c δ = 3 log e + 2γ δ log 2 + 2 log max
and
gence of order α.
Remark 1
The inequality (7) is trivially true for δ outside of the expressed range.
The important quantity in the lemma above is γ δ , which is the exponent that soft-covering achieves. We see in (7) that the double-exponential convergence of probability occurs with exponent δ > 0. Thus, the best soft-covering exponent that the lemma achieves with confidence, over all δ > 0, is
The double-exponential confidence rate δ acts as a reduction in codebook rate R in the definition of γ δ . Consequently, γ δ = 0 for δ ≥ R − I(U ; V ).
Remark 2 (Total Variation Exponent of Decay)
The stronger soft-covering lemma can be reproduced while replacing the relative divergence with total variation [33] . Although Before proving Lemma 1, we note that the name 'stronger soft-covering lemma' is justified because (6) implies that the expectation of the relative entropy over the ensemble of codebooks decays exponentially fast (i.e., Wyner's notion of soft-covering). This is stated in the following lemma and proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 (Stronger than Wyner's Soft-Covering Lemma)
Let γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 be such that (6) holds for n large enough, then for every such n,
Proof of Lemma 1:
We state the proof in terms of arbitrary distributions (not necessarily discrete). When needed, we will specialize to the case that V is finite. For any fixed codebook C n , let the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the induced and desired distributions be denoted as
In the discrete case, this is just a ratio of probability mass functions. Accordingly, the relative entropy of interest, which is a function of the codebook B n , is given by
To describe the jointly-typical set over u-and v-sequences, we first define information density i QU,V , which is a function on the space U × V specified by
In (13), the argument of the logarithm is the Radon-Nikodym derivative between Q V |U=u and Q V . Let ǫ ≥ 0 be arbitrary, to be determined later, and define
and note that
We split P (Bn) V into two parts, making use of the indicator function. For every v ∈ V n , define
The measures P Bn,1 and P Bn,2 on the space V n are not probability measures, but P Bn,1 + P Bn,2 = P (Bn) V for each codebook B n . We also split ∆ Bn into two parts. Namely, for every v ∈ V n , we set
With respect to the above definitions, Lemma 3 states an upper bound on the relative entropy of interest.
Lemma 3 For every fixed codebook B n , we have
where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. Based on Lemma 3, if the relative entropy of interest does not decay exponentially fast, then the same is true for the terms on the right-hand side (RHS) of (18) . Therefore, to establish Lemma 1, its suffices to show that the probability (with respect to a random codebook) of the RHS not vanishing exponentially fast to 0 as n → ∞, is double-exponentially small. Notice that P Bn,1 usually contains almost all of the probability. That is, for any fixed B n , we have
For a random codebook, (19) becomes
The RHS of (20) is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. random variables bounded between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the expected value of each one is the exponentially small probability of correlated sequences being atypical:
where (a) is true for any λ ≥ 0, (b) is Markov's inequality, (c) follows by restricting λ to be strictly positive, while (d) is from the definition of the Rényi divergence of order λ + 1. We use units of bits for mutual information and Rényi divergence to coincide with the base two expression of rate. Now, substituting α = λ + 1 into (21) gives
for every α > 1 and ǫ ≥ 0, over which we may optimize. The optimal choice of ǫ is apparent when all bounds of the proof are considered together (some yet to be derived), but the formula may seem arbitrary at the moment. Nevertheless, fix δ ∈ 0, R − I(U ; V ) , as found in the theorem statement, and set
Observe that ǫ α,δ in (23) is nonnegative under the as-
Next, we use the following version of the Chernoff bound to bound the probability of (20) 
The proof is given in Appendix C. Using (25) with M = 2 nR , µ = 2 −nβ α,δ , B = 1, and c µ = 2, assures that dP Bn,2 is exponentially small with probability doubly-exponentially close to 1. That is
Similarly, ∆ Bn,1 is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. and uniformly bounded functions, each one determined by one sequence in the random codebook:
. (27) For every term in the average, the indicator function bounds the value to be between 0 and 2 n(I(U;V )+ǫ α,δ ) . The expected value of each term with respect to the codebook is bounded above by one, which is observed by removing the indicator function. Therefore, the Chernoff bound assures that ∆ Bn,1 is exponentially close to one for every v ∈ V n . Setting M = 2 nR , µ = 1, B = 2 n(I(U;V )+ǫ α,δ ) , and
which decays doubly-exponentially fast for any δ > 0.
At this point, we specialize to a finite set V. Consequently, ∆ Bn,2 is bounded as
with probability 1. Notice that the maximum is only over the support of Q V , which makes this bound finite. The underlying reason for this restriction is that with probability one a conditional distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to its associated marginal distribution. Having (26) , (28) and (29), we can now bound the probability that the RHS of (18) is not exponentially small. Let S be the set of codebooks B n , such that all of the following are true:
First, we use the union bound, while taking advantage of the fact that the space V n is only exponentially large, to show that the probability of a random codebook not being in S is double-exponentially small:
where (a) is the union bound, (b) uses (26), (28) and (29), while (c) follows because β α,δ ≤ 1 2 (R − δ).
Next, we claim that for every codebook in S, the RHS of (18) is exponentially small. Let B n ∈ S and consider the following. For every x ∈ [0, 1], h(x) ≤ x log e x , using which (30a) implies that h dP Bn,1 = h dP Bn,2 < 2 log e + β α,δ log 2 n2 −nβ α,δ .
Furthermore, by (30b), we have
where (a) follows since log(1 + x) ≤ x log e, for every x > 0. Finally, using (30c) we obtain dP Bn,2 log ∆ Bn,2 ≤ dP Bn,2 log max
Combining (32)- (34), yields h dP Bn,1 + dP Bn,1 log ∆ Bn,1 + dP Bn,2 log ∆ Bn,2 < 2 log e + β α,δ log 2 + log e + 2 log max
where (a) comes from setting c α,δ 3 log e + 2β α,δ log 2 + 2 log max
.
(36) This implies that for all α > 1 and δ ∈ 0, R − I(U ; V ) ,
where (a) follows from (31) . Denoting c δ sup α>1 c α,δ , (37) further gives
(38) Since (38) is true for all α > 1, it must also be true, with strict inequality in the LHS, when replacing β α,δ with
which is the exponential rate of convergence stated in (8a) that we derive for the strong soft-covering lemma. This establishes the statement from (7) and proves Lemma 1.
Concluding, if R > I(U ; V ) and for any δ ∈ 0, R − I(U ; V ) , we get exponential convergence of the relative entropy at rate O(2 −γ δ n ) with doubly-exponential certainty. Discarding the precise exponents of convergence and coefficients, we state that there exist γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, such that for n large enough
IV. WIRETAP CHANNEL I
As a rather simple application of stronger soft-covering lemma, we give an alternative derivation of the SS-capacity of the WTC I [2] , [21] , [23] , [24] . Since the channel to the legitimate user is the same in both WTCs I and II, the maximal error probability analysis presented here is subsequently used to establish reliability for the WTC II.
Our direct proof relies on classic wiretap codes and SS is established using the union bound while invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. In a wiretap code, a subcode is associated with each confidential message. To transmit a certain message, a codeword from its subcode is selected uniformly at random and transmitted over the channel. Letting these subcodes be large enough while noting that the number of confidential messages only grows exponentially with the blocklength, the union bound and the double-exponential decay the lemma provides show the existence of a semanticallysecure sequence of codes. Using these codes, each transmitted message induces an output PMF at the eavesdropper that appears i.i.d. and does not depend on the message.
Wyner's soft-covering lemma, that is now a standard tool for achieving strong-secrecy for the WTC I, comes up short in providing SS. The classic soft-covering argument says that on average over the messages, the output at the eavesdropper will look i.i.d., provided that the size of these subcodes is large enough. This can be used to claim that the unnormalized mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's output is small, thus ensuring strong-secrecy. However, for SS, it must be claimed that the output PMF is close the i.i.d. distribution for all messages, and there are exponentially many messages. Here is where the stronger soft-covering lemma is advantageous. 
A. Problem Definition
The DM-WTC I is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The sender chooses a message m from the set 1 : 2 nR and maps it into a sequence x ∈ X n (the mapping may be random). The sequence x is transmitted over the DM-WTC I with transition probability Q Y,Z|X . The output sequences y ∈ Y n and z ∈ Z n are observed by the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Based on y, the receiver produces an estimatem of m. The eavesdropper tries to glean whatever it can about the message from z.
For any message distribution P M ∈ P(M), the joint PMF over M × X n × Y n × Z n ×M induced by P M and an (n, R) code C n is:
Definition 2 (Maximal Error Probability) The maximal error probability of an (n, R) WTC I code C n is
where I Cn denotes a mutual information term that is calculated with respect to the PMF induced by C n from (41).
Definition 4 (Semantically-Secure Codes)
A sequence of (n, R) WTC I codes C n n∈N is semantically-secure if there is a constants γ > 0 and an n 0 ∈ N, such that for every n > n 0 , Sem(C n ) ≤ e −nγ . [21] , [28] , [34] .
Definition 5 (SS-Achievability)
A rate R ∈ R + is SSachievable if there is a sequence of (n, R) WTC I semanticallysecure codes C n n∈N with e ⋆ (C n ) → 0 as n → ∞.
Definition 6 (SS-Capacity)
The SS-capacity of the WTC I, C Sem , is the supremum of the set of SS-achievable rates.
B. Results
As stated in the following theorem, the SS-capacity of the WTC I under a maximal error probability constraint is the same as its weak-secrecy-capacity under an average error probability constraint.
Theorem 1 (WTC I SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity of the WTC I is
and one may restrict the cardinality of V to |U| < |X |.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV-C1. Our achievability proof relies on the stronger soft-covering lemma to establish the existence of a sequence of semanticallysecure codes with a vanishing average probability of error. The expurgation technique [22, Theorem 7.7 .1] is then used to upgrade the codes to have a vanishing maximal error probability. 
Remark 5

C. Proofs 1) Theorem 1:
For the converse, let C n n∈N be a sequence of (n, R) semantically-secure WTC I codes with e ⋆ (C n ) → 0. Since both e ⋆ (C n ) → 0 and Sem(C n ) → 0 hold for any message distribution P M ∈ P(M), in particular, they hold for a uniform P M . The converse thus follows since C Sem in (44) coincides with the secrecy-capacity of the WTC I under a vanishing average error probability criterion and the weaksecrecy constraint.
For the direct part, we first establish the achievability of (44) when U = X. Then, a standard channel prefixing argument extends the proof to any U with U − X − Y .
Fix ǫ > 0, a PMF Q X ∈ P(X ), and let M and W be independent random variables uniformly distributed over M and W 1 : 2 nR , respectively. M represents the choice of the message, while W stands for the stochastic part of the encoder. Thus, we start by imposing a uniform distribution over the set of messages and use this to show the existence of a semantically-secure sequence of (n, R) codes with a vanishing average error probability. Afterwards, the uniform message distribution assumption is dropped using the expurgation technique [22, Theorem 7.7.1], which allows upgrading reliability to achieve a vanishing maximal error probability, while preserving SS.
Codebook B n : Let B n be a random codebook given by a collection of i.i.d. random vectors B n = X(m, w) (m,w)∈M×W , each distributed according to Q n X . A realization of B n is denoted by B n x(m, w, B n ) (m,w)∈M×W , with respect to which a classic wiretap code is constructed.
Encoder f 1 : To send m ∈ M the encoder randomly and uniformly chooses W = w from W and transmits x(m, w, B n ) over the WTC I.
Decoder φ 1 : Upon observing y ∈ Y n , the decoder searches for a unique pair (m,ŵ) ∈ M × W such that
If such a unique pair is found, then set φ 1 (y) =m; otherwise, φ 1 (y) = e.
The triple (M, f 1 , φ 1 ) defined with respect to the codebook B n constitutes an (n, R) WTC I code C n . When a random codebook B n is used, we denote the corresponding random code by C n .
Average Error Probability Analysis: By standard joint typicality arguments we show that the average error probability, when expected over the ensemble of codebooks, is arbitrarily small. For every fixed codebook B n and (m,w) ∈ M×W, define the event
where Y ∼ Q n Y |X=x(m,w,Bn) is the random sequence observed at the receiver when the transmitted sends (m,w). We have
where (a) uses the symmetry of the codebook construction with respect to m and w, (b) follows by the decoding rule, while (c) takes the expectation over the ensemble of codebooks and uses the union bound. By the law of large numbers P 1 → 0 as n → ∞, while P 2 → 0 as n grows provided that 4 R +R < I(X; Y ).
Thus, we have
Security Analysis: For any fixed B n (which, in turn, fixed C n ), we denote by P induced by the code C n (see (41)). For any B n , we first have
where (a) uses the relative entropy chain rule, while is because for any P M ∈ P(M), we have
Now, letγ be an arbitrary positive real number to be determined later and consider the following probability.
where (a) follows from (50) and (50).
By the stronger soft-covering lemma, if
then there are γ 1 , γ 2 > such that
for sufficiently large n. Inserting (54) into (52) while settingγ = γ 1 , we have
and therefore,
Inequality (56) implies that ifR satisfies (53), the probability that a randomly generated sequence of codes meets the SS criterion for large n is arbitrarily close to 1. In fact, because (55) decays so rapidly, the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that almost every sequence of realizations of C n n∈N is semantically-secure.
SS-Achievability:
To establish the existence of a sequence of (n, 2 nR ) reliable and semantically-secure codes C n n∈N , we reproduce the Selection Lemma [36, Lemma 2.2].
Lemma 5 (Selection Lemma) Let A n n∈N be a sequence of random variables, where A n takes values in
be a collection of I < ∞ sequences of bounded functions f
then there exists a sequence {a n } n∈N , where a n ∈ A n for every n ∈ N, such that
For completeness, the proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix D. Applying Lemma 5 to the random variables C n n∈N and the functions 1 |M| m∈M e m (C n ) and 1 Sem(Cn)>e −nγ 1 , while using (49) and (55), we have that there is a sequence of (n, R) WTC I codes C n n∈N , for which
Since the indicator function in (58b) takes only the values 0 and 1, to satisfy the convergence there must exist an n 0 ∈ N, such that
The final step is to amend C n n∈N to be reliable with respect to the maximal error probability (as defined in (42a)). This is done using the expurgation technique (see, e.g., [22, Theorem 7.7 .1]). Namely, we discard the worst half of the codewords in each codebook B n . Denoting the amended sequence of codebooks by B 
Note that in each C ⋆ n there are 2 nR−1 codewords, i.e., throwing out half the codewords has changed the rate from R to R − 1 n , which is negligible for large n. Further note that because C n n∈N is semantically-secure, so is C ⋆ n n∈N . Combining (48) with (53), we have that every
is SS-achievable.
To establish the achievability of C Sem from (44), we prefix a DM-channel (DMC) Q X|V to the original WTC I Q Y,Z|X to obtain a new channel Q Y,Z|V , where
Using a similar analysis as above with respect to Q Y,Z|V , any
is achievable.
V. WIRETAP CHANNEL II The WTC II scenario considers communication between two legitimate parties in the presence of an eavesdropper that can choose to observed any subset of the transmitted sequence, while being limited in quantity. The challenge in this setting is that the eavesdropper knows the codebook when it selects the subset to observe. Therefore, secrecy will only be achieved if it is achieved uniformly for all selections of packets, of which there are exponentially many possibilities. Furthermore, SS being our goal, secrecy must be ensured for each one of the exponentially many confidential messages. Nonetheless, as the combined number of subsets and messages grows only exponentially with the blocklenght, using the stronger softcovering lemma we show that rates all the way up to the weaksecrecy-capacity of the DM erasure WTC I are achievable even in this more stringent setting. Then, we establish the capacity of this WTC I as an upper bound on the considered WTC II, thus characterizing its SS-capacity.
A. Problem Definition
The WTC II is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The sender chooses a message m from the set 1 : 2 nR and maps it into a sequence x ∈ X n (the mapping may be random). The sequence x is transmitted over a point-to-point DMC with transition probability Q Y |X . Based on the received channel output sequence y ∈ Y n , the receiver produces an estimatem of m. The eavesdropper noiselessly observes a subset of its choice of the n transmitted symbols. Namely, the eavesdropped chooses S ⊆ [1 : n], |S| = µ ≤ n, and observes z ∈ X ∪ {?} n , where
Eave. m m Fig. 3 . The type II wiretap channel.
Based on z, the eavesdropper tries to learn as much as possible about the message. With some abuse of notation (reusing notations from Section IV-A), we introduce the following definitions. An (n, R) WTC II code C n and the corresponding maximal error probability e ⋆ (C n ) are defined similarly to Definitions 1 and 2, respectively.
Definition 7 (SS Metric) The SS metric with respect to an
where I Cn denotes that the mutual information term is calculated with respect to and µ = ⌊αn⌋, a sequence of (n, R) WTC II codes C n n∈N is α-semantically-secure if there is a constants γ > 0 and an n 0 ∈ N, such that for every n > n 0 , Sem µ (C n ) ≤ e −nγ .
Remark 8 As explained in Remark 3, the code
Definition 9 (SS-Achievability)
Let α ∈ [0, 1] and µ = ⌊αn⌋, a rate R ∈ R + is α-SS-achievable if there is a sequence of (n, R) α-semantically-secure WTC II codes C n n∈N with e ⋆ (C n ) → 0 as n → ∞.
Definition 10 (SS-Capacity)
For any α ∈ [0, 1], the α-SScapacity of the WTC II C Sem (α) is the supremum of the set of α-SS-achievable rates.
B. Converse
The following proposition is subsequently used for the converse proof of the WTC II SS-capacity. The proposition states that the strong-secrecy-capacity of a WTC I with a DM-EC to the eavesdropper is an upper bound on the strongsecrecy-capacity of the WTC II. To formulate the result, slight modifications of some of the definitions from Sections IV-A and V-A are required. Specifically, we redefine the achievable rates for each setting with respect to a strongsecrecy requirement (instead of SS).
Definition 11 (Strong-Secrecy Achievability for WTC I)
A rate R ∈ R + is strong-secrecy-achievable for the WTC I if there is a sequence of (n, R) codes C 1,n n∈N with
where M is uniformly distributed over the message set M.
Definition 12 (Strong-Secrecy Achievability for WTC II)
Let α ∈ [0, 1] and µ = ⌊αn⌋, a rate R ∈ R + is α-strongsecrecy-achievable for the WTC II if there is a sequence of (n, R) codes C 2,n n∈N with
The strong-secrecy-capacity for both setting is defined as the supremum of the set of strong-secrecy-achievable rates. 
Z|X is a DM-EC with erasure probabilityβ = 1 − β, i.e.,
See Section V-C1 for the proof. Proposition 1 is subsequently combined with the following lemma to to establish the converse for the α-SS-capacity of the WTC II. 
is continues inside (0, 1).
The proof of Lemma 6 is relegated to Appendix E. The SScapacity of the WTC II with a noisy main channel is stated next.
Theorem 2 (WTC II SS-Capacity)
and one may restrict the cardinality of U to |U| < |X |.
The converse and direct parts of Theorem 2 are established in Sections V-C2 and V-C3, respectively. As oppose to the SScapacity of the WTC I (where achievability may be derived without using Lemma 1 -see Remark 6), for the WTC II, the stronger soft-covering lemma is essential for the direct proof. Specifically, via the union bound, the double-exponential decay that Lemma 1 provides is leveraged to show the existence of a sequence of codes that satisfies the vanishing information leakage requirement for all choices of S and P M . 
Remark 10
The cardinality bound in Theorem 2 is established using the convex cover method [35, Appendix C] . The details are omitted. [8, Equation (7) ] by setting U = X and taking X to be uniformly distributed over X . Furthermore, in [8] secrecy was established while assuming a uniform distribution over the message set, i.e., on average over the messages. Although we require security with respect to a stricter metric (SS versus weak-secrecy), we achieve higher rates than [8, Equation (7)] and show their optimality. Moreover, to achieve (72), we use classic wiretap codes and establish SS using the stronger softcovering lemma, making the (rather convoluted) coset coding scheme from [8] (inspired by [7] ) no longer required.
Remark 11 Theorem 2 recovers the achievability result from
C. Proofs 1) Proposition 1:
The equality in (70) follows by evaluating the strong-secrecy-capacity formula of a general WTC I, i.e., max QU,X :
for the case where the transition probability matrix is Q
(1)
Z|X . Let Φ ∼ Ber(β) be a random variable, such that its i.i.d. samples define the erasure process of the DM-EC with erasure probabilityβ. Accordingly, Φ is independent of X and
First note that Φ is determined by Z since ? / ∈ X . Combining this with the Markov relation U − X − (Y, Z) implies that the chain U − X − (Y, Z, Φ) is also Markov. Along with the independence of X and Φ, this implies that U and Φ are also independent. Consequently, for every Q U,X , where U − X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain, we have
where (a) follows since Φ is defined by Z, while (b) and (c) follows by the independence of Φ and U . Since (76) holds for every Q U,X as above, we conclude that
To prove the inequality in (70), we show that for any α ∈ (0, 1] and β ∈ [0, α), an α-strong-secrecy-achievable rate for the WTC II is also achievable for the WTC I with erasure probabilityβ.
Fix α, β as above and let R ∈ R + be an α-strong-secrecyachievable rate for the WTC II. Furthermore, let C 2,n n∈N be the corresponding sequence of (n, R) codes satisfying (68). Since the channel to the legitimate receiver and the definition of the maximal error probability are the same for both versions of the WTC (see (67a) and (68a)), C 2,n n∈N is also reliable when using it to transmit over the WTC I. Therefore, to establish (70), it suffices to show that for every ǫ > 0, there is an n ⋆ ∈ N, such that for every n > n
where Z 1 denoted the channel output sequences observed by the eavesdroppers of the WTC I. In other words, we show that the sequence of codes C 2,n n∈N , designed to achieve strongsecrecy for the WTC II, also achieves strong-secrecy for the WTC I.
Let Z 2 be the channel output observed by the eavesdroppers of the WTC II, fix ǫ > 0 and let n 0 ∈ N be such that for every n > n 0 , max
For every z ∈ Z n , where Z X ∪ {?}, define
and let Θ(Z) be
Namely, Θ indicates if the number of erasures in a sequence z ∈ Z n is greater than or equal to ⌈ᾱn⌉ or not. By conditioning the mutual information term from (78) on Θ(Z 1 ), we distinguish between the two cases of Z 1 being better or worse than Z 2 in terms of the number of erased symbols. When Θ(Z 1 ) = 0, i.e., Z 1 is worse that Z 2 , security for the WTC I is ensured since C 2,n n∈N achieve security for the WTC II. Otherwise, for the case that Θ(Z 1 ) = 1, where Z 1 is better than Z 2 , we use Sanov's Theorem to show that the probability of such an event exponentially decreases with the blocklength n, while the mutual information grows linearly at most. For any n ∈ N, we have
where (a) is because Θ Z 1 is a function of Z 1 , while (b) follows since the number of erasures in the output sequence of a DM-EC is defined by an i.i.d. process that is independent of the message.
For I 0 , taking any n > n 0 , (79) implies that
(83) To upper bound I 1 , first note that
holds for every n ∈ N. Now, fix any δ ∈ (β, α); there exists an n 1 (δ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n 1 ⌈ᾱn⌉ ≤δn <βn.
Thus, for every n > n 1 (δ) Sanov's Theorem [22, Theorem 11.4 .1] implies
where D b (δ, β) = α log ( δ /β) +δ log (δ/β) is the relative entropy between the PMFs of two binary random variables distributed according to Ber(δ) and Ber(β), respectively. Since δ = β, we have that D b (δ, β) > 0, and therefore, there is an n 1 (δ) < n 2 ∈ N, such that for every n > n 2 ,
Set n ⋆ = max{n 0 , n 2 }. Based on (83) and (87), for every n > n ⋆ , we have
which completes the proof.
2) Theorem 2 -Converse: For the converse, we first show that with respect to the notations used in Proposition 1,
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. For α = 0, 1, the relation is straightforward as
For α ∈ (0, 1), (89) is established by relying on Proposition 1 and the continuity argument from Lemma 6. Namely, by taking the limit of (70) as β ↑ α establishes (89).
Having this, the converse follows by arguments similar to those presented in Section IV-C1. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] and let R ∈ R + be an α-SS-achievable rate for the WTC II and C n n∈N be its corresponding (n, R) sequence of codes. By the definitions in (42a) and (66), C n n∈N are reliable and α-semantically-secure for every message distribution, and in particular, for a uniform message distribution. This implies
and completes the converse proof.
Remark 12
Our converse proof relies on the achievability being defined in terms of a limit as n → ∞ (see Definition 9) . Namely, we show that in the limit, the eavesdropper in the WTC I setting is likely to be within a slightly higher channel-observation budget than this of the WTC II, which by continuity won't result in much extra rate. The chance of having too many channel observations is too small to provide non-negligible extra information. If, however, the blocklength n can be chosen as a design parameter, then it may be possible that a finite n results in a higher achievable secrecy-rate. For instance, notice that the optimal code of length 2n in not necessarily better than the optimal code of length n, since when the blocklenght is longer the eavesdropper has more flexibility in choosing his observations.
3) Theorem 2 -Direct Part: As before, we start by showing the achievability of (72) when U = X. After doing so, we use channel prefixing to extend the proof to any U with U −X −Y .
Fix α ∈ [0, 1], ǫ > 0 and a PMF Q X on X . Letting M and W be independent random variables uniformly distributed over M and W = [1 : 2 nR ], respectively, we repeat the code construction from Section IV-C1. A similar analysis of the average error probability shows that if
where C n is the random code that corresponds to the random codebook B n . Security Analysis: Fix S ⊆ [1 : n] with |S| = µ = ⌊αn⌋, recall that Z X ∪{?} and define the following PMF on Z n ,
where I Z is the average output PMF of the identity DMC on X , i.e.,
For any C n (defined by fixing B n ) and P M ∈ P(M), the relative entropy chain rule implies
and therefore
For any ∅ = A ⊆ [1 : n] and z ∈ Z n , recall that z A (z i ) i∈A is the sub-vector of z indexed by the elements of A. The relative entropy chain rule further simplifies the RHS of (97) as follows. For any m ∈ M, we have
where (a) is because P (Cn,S)
Z S c , for every z S ∈ Z |S| , and (b) follows from (94).
Combining (96)- (98), we have that for every C n and S ⊆ [1 : n], with |S| = µ = ⌊αn⌋,
In particular, (99) also holds when maximizing over the substes S, which gives
Having (100), letδ be an arbitrary positive real number to be determined later and consider the following probability.
where (a) uses (100), and (b) is the union bound. Each term in the sum on the RHS of (101) falls into the framework of the stronger soft-covering lemma, with respect to a blocklength of µ and the identity channel. Noting that |W| = 2 nR = 2 µ nR µ , we have that as long as
there exist δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 that for sufficiently large n satisfy
Since µ = ⌊αn⌋ ≤ αn, taking
is sufficient to satisfy (102) for every n ∈ N. Settingδ = δ 1 and plugging (103) into (101), gives Invoking Lemma 5 once more, we have that if (92) and (102) are satisfied, then there is a sequence of (n, R) α-semantically-secure codes C n n∈N , with
The pruning argument from Section IV-C1 again upgrades C n n∈N to be reliable with respect to the maximal error probability. Combining (92) and (102) shows the achievability of R < max
Finally, we prefix a DMC Q X|U to the original WTC II to obtain a new main channel Q Y |U , given by
Furthermore, Γ
Z from (94) is redefined as Γ (S)
where Q Z is given by
Repeating a similar analysis as above shows that reliability is achieved if
while the rate needed for the stronger soft-covering lemma is
Putting ( 
is strongly α-SS-achievable and concludes the proof.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We derived the SS capacity of the WTC II with a noisy main channel. The SS metric ensures that the unnormalized mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper's observation is arbitrarily small, even when maximized over all message distributions and all possible choices of the eavesdropper's observation. The main tool used in the direct proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner's soft covering lemma, that states that a random codebook achieves the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability as long as its rate is higher than the mutual information between the input and output of the DMC. Furthermore, the probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength, thus making the lemma advantageous in proving the existence of codebooks that satisfy exponentially many constraints. A code that achieves SS for the considered WTC II should do just that.
The SS capacity was achieved by using classic Wyner's wiretap codes. Since the combined number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS was established by applying the union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof showed that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the WTC I with a DM-EC to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse followed by showing that the capacity of this WTC I is an upper bound on the SS capacity of the WTC II.
As a preliminary and simple application of the stronger softcovering lemma, it was used to achieve SS for the WTC I. A main goal in doing so was to emphasize the advantage of this approach over other methods for achieving SS for this scenario, such as the expurgation technique. While the expurgation method fails to generalize to some multiuser settings, such as the multiple access WTC, an achievability proof that relies on the stronger soft-covering lemma goes through by similar steps to those presented here. Thus making the stronger soft-covering lemma a tool by which the common weak-secrecy and strong-secrecy results can be upgraded to SS. Furthermore, the lemma might prove useful in any other scenario in which performance is measures with respect to an exponential number of constraints.
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let n 0 ∈ N be such that (6) holds for any n > n 0 . For these values of n we have ≤ e −nγ1 + n log 1
where (a) follows because for every fixed B n D P 
Note that for θ = 1, 2, we have 
and consequently, for every measurable A ⊆ V n ,
V ∈ A, Θ = θ = P P Bn,θ V ∈ A = A dP Bn,θ .
For simplicity of notation, denote P (Bn) V P , P Bn,1 P 1 , P Bn,2 P 2 , Q n V Q and P (Bn) Θ Γ Θ , and consider D(P ||Q) = dP log dP dQ (a) = dQ dP dQ log dP dQ
dP θ log dP θ dQ (e) = h dP 1 + θ=1,2 dP θ log ∆ Bn,θ ,
where: (a) follows since for any two measures µ, λ with µ ≪ λ and a µ−integrable function g, we have
(b) follows from (115) and the law of total probability; (c) follows by applying Jensens inequality to the convex function x → x log(x); (d) follows by the properties of the logarithm and (117); (e) follows from (114) and the definition of ∆ Bn,θ , for θ = 1, 2, in (17). and δ n → 0 as n → ∞. We have 
Therefore, there exists a realization {a n } n∈N of A n n∈N such that
n (a n ) < (I + 1)δ n δ n , ∀i ∈ [1 : I], n ∈ N. (125) Since I < ∞ independently of n, we haveδ n → 0 as n → ∞.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We prove the continuity of C 
Furthermore, for every β ∈ (0, 1),
